BÉSAME
TONTO
La Sentencia del Tribunal General de la Unión europea
de 30 de septiembre de 2015, T‑364/13, “Lacoste”,
resuelve el conflicto suscitado entre la empresa francesa LACOSTE SA y la polaca MOCEK & WENTA KAJMAN, ilustrándonos cómo
afecta la notoriedad de una marca a la hora de valorar su carácter distintivo,
pudiendo extrapolar sus razonamientos a marcas como “El Toro de OSBORNE”, al
concurrir eadem ratio.
En el año 2007, MOCEK & WENTA KAJMAN presentó una
solicitud de registro de marca comunitaria reproducida a continuación
reivindicando, entre otros, productos de las clases 18, 20, 22, 25 y 36. En
particular, prendas de vestir, calzado, bolsos y arrendamientos inmobiliarios.
Contra la anterior solicitud, la sociedad francesa
Lacoste presentó en el año 2008 oposición con base en el registro de marca
comunitaria anterior de su conocido cocodrilo
reivindicando, entre otros, productos de las clases 18, 20, 24 y 25:
Mediante resolución de 20 de octubre
de 2010, la División de Oposición desestimó la oposición formulada por LACOSTE.
En la medida en que la oposición se formuló sobre la base de la planta
establecida en el artículo 8 (1) (b) del Reglamento nº 207/2009, se encontró
que los productos y servicios designados por las marcas en conflicto son
idénticos o similares, que los signos en conflicto eran visual y fonéticamente
diferentes, que tenían una similitud conceptual baja y que el carácter
distintivo de la marca anterior era normal. También encontró que las
representaciones gráficas de las marcas en conflicto eran tan diferentes que el
vínculo conceptual entre las marcas no fue suficiente para contrarrestar las
diferencias gráficas y fonéticas y, en consecuencia, llegaron a la conclusión
de que no existía riesgo de confusión entre las marcas en conflicto. Por
último, indicó que la oposición no podía estimarse en virtud del artículo 8
(5), del Reglamento nº 207/2009, dado que la parte coadyuvante no había
proporcionado ningún hechos, argumentos o pruebas que podrían apoyar la
conclusión de que el uso de la marca solicitada se aproveche indebidamente, o
podría ser perjudicial para el carácter distintivo o de la notoriedad de la
marca anterior.
Sin embargo, mediante resolución de 10 de mayo de 2013, la
Cuarta Sala de Recurso de la OAMI estimó parcialmente el recurso y anuló la
resolución de la División de Oposición en la medida en que se llegó a la
conclusión de que no existía riesgo de confusión entre la marcas en conflicto
en relación con los productos de las clases 18 y 25. En contra de la División
de Oposición, la Sala de Recurso decidió que existía un riesgo de confusión en
relación con dichos productos en vista de la similitud conceptual entre los
signos en conflicto que surgen de la presencia de elementos figurativos que
concuerdan y del carácter distintivo probada y la reputación de la marca
anterior en relación con algunos de los productos de las clases 18 y 25, a
pesar del hecho de que las marcas en conflicto son fonéticamente diferentes y
el hecho de que no había un bajo grado de similitud visual. Sin embargo, se
desestimó el recurso de casación, al considerar que no existía riesgo de
confusión con respecto a los bienes y servicios de las clases 20, 22 y 36, dado
que aquellos bienes y servicios que no son similares a los productos de las
clases 18 y 25 de los cuales se habían establecido el carácter distintivo y la
reputación, y que no se habían demostrado que el uso de la marca solicitada en
relación con dichos productos y servicios pretenda obtener una ventaja injusta,
o podría ser perjudicial para el carácter distintivo o de la notoriedad de la
marca anterior en relación con los productos de las clases 18 y 25, a los
efectos del artículo 8 (5), del Reglamento nº 207/2009.
La anterior resolución motivó la presentación de un
recurso por parte de MOCEK & WENTA ante el Tribunal General solicitando su
anulación.
En este sentido, el Tribunal consideró que la
similitud gráfica de ambos signos es mínima y la similitud fonética es
indiferente ya que la marca LACOSTE, no contiene elementos denominativos, a
diferencia de la marca aspirante. Sin
embargo, en el plano conceptual, el Tribunal confirmó que el grado de similitud
entre los signos es medio, pues los elementos figurativos de ambas marcas se
refieren al mismo concepto: el de “reptil del género de los cocodrilos
presentado de perfil con la cola curvada”.
34 The
Board of Appeal stated in paragraph 29 of the contested decision that
visually the marks at issue were the same in that they both represented a
crocodile. However, in view of the fact that the manner in which that animal is
represented in each mark varied in different aspects, it concluded that the
signs had a low visual similarity.
35 Whilst
accepting that the marks at issue have in common a representation of an animal
of the order of crocodilians, the applicant claims that they are not visually
similar, given that those representations are very different. The applicant
states that the earlier mark represents an attacking, aggressive crocodile,
with its muzzle open, while the mark applied for consists of the word ‘kajman’
in printed characters, stylised to form a sleeping reptile, with the mark’s
overall appearance suggesting a technical object rather than an animal, given
the geometrical forms and regular straight lines which, as a rule, do not exist
in the animal world. It also states that the earlier mark is registered in
black and white, while the mark applied for uses the colour blue, ‘determined …
as green’. In addition, it claims that the earlier mark is used in trade with
the image of a crocodile in green with a visible red tongue against a white
background around the crocodile, and that that image is preserved in the memory
of the consumers.
MOCEK & WENTA alegó que la representación gráfica
de ambos cocodrilos era completamente diversa, siendo la representación del
reptil de LACOSTE más realista y en una posición agresiva. Por su parte, el
cocodrilo de MOCEK & WENTA se representa acostado, de un color
completamente distinto y se constituye en su parte central por letras que no se
encuentran presentes en el reptil de LACOSTE.
38 It is true,
as the applicant claims, that in the mark applied for the reptile is
represented in a stylised manner in a sleeping position, with the torso made up
of the letters of the word ‘kajman’, while in the earlier mark there is a
rather realistic representation of a crocodile in an aggressive position
standing on its feet. However, given that the average consumer must, as a
general rule, place his trust in the imperfect picture of the marks that he has
kept in his mind (judgment of 22 June 1999 in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer,
C‑342/97, ECR, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 26), the visual perception of the
marks at issue will not be sufficiently affected by those visual differences.
Contrary to what the applicant claims, in both cases the general public will
clearly recognise and retain a memory of the representation of a reptile of the
order of crocodilians, presented in profile with a curved tail (see,vvv by
analogy, judgment of 17 April 2008 in Dainichiseika Colour &
Chemicals Mfg. v OHIM — Pelikan (Representation of a pelican),
T‑389/03, EU:T:2008:114, paragraphs 80 and 82).
39 The
presence of the verbal element ‘kajman’ in the composition of the mark applied
for does not, moreover, neutralise the existence of a certain visual similarity
between the signs at issue in that it is possible that a consumer will not
perceive it separately, but as
an integral part of the figurative aspect of the mark. The applicant itself
accepts, in essence, that that element is incorporated in the image of a
crocodile forming the central part of its body (see paragraph 35 above).
40 Finally,
the fact that the applicant claims a colour for the mark applied for, while the
earlier mark is registered in black and white, could diminish the visual
similarity between the signs at issue but does not eliminate it completely. The
presence of a colour in the mark applied for essentially loses any significance
when making the comparison with the earlier mark, because the earlier mark is a
black-and-white image. Thus, confronted with the mark applied for, the average
consumer, who keeps in mind only an imperfect picture of the marks (see
paragraph 38 above), might reasonably think that it is only the colour
version of the earlier mark (judgment of 14 December 2006 in Mast-Jägermeister
v OHIM — Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03,
T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, ECR, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 104).
42 It
follows that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that, bearing in mind
that the signs vary in different aspects of the representation of a crocodile,
there was a low degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue.
45 In
that regard, it must be pointed out, as the applicant rightly does, that a
phonetic comparison is not relevant in the examination of the similarity of a
figurative mark without word elements with another mark (see, to that effect,
judgment of 25 March 2010 in Nestlé v OHIM — Master
Beverage Industries (Golden Eagle and Golden Eagle Deluxe), T‑5/08 to T‑7/08,
ECR, EU:T:2010:123, paragraph 67). A figurative mark lacking word elements
cannot, by definition, be pronounced. At the very most, its visual or
conceptual content can be described orally. Such a description, however,
necessarily coincides with either the visual perception or the conceptual
perception of the mark in question. Accordingly, there is no need to examine
separately the phonetic perception of a figurative mark lacking word elements
and to compare it with the phonetic perception of other marks (judgment of
7 February 2012 in Dosenbach-Ochsner v OHIM — Sisma
(Representation of elephants in a rectangle), T‑424/10, ECR, EU:T:2012:58,
paragraph 46).
46 It
follows, in the present case, that it cannot be concluded that there is either
a phonetic similarity or a phonetic dissimilarity between the marks at issue
given that the earlier mark is a figurative mark lacking word elements.
The conceptual similarity
47 It
is apparent from paragraph 31 of the contested decision that the Board of
Appeal took the view that, since the marks at issue are perceived as
representing an animal of the order of crocodilians, they had an analogous
semantic content and were thus conceptually similar. That similarity, according
to the Board of Appeal, is strengthened by the presence of the word ‘kajman’ in
the mark applied for, which is very close to the English word ‘caiman’, the
French word ‘caïman’, the German word ‘kaiman’, the Spanish word ‘caimán’ and
the Italian word ‘caimano’. In combination with the figurative aspect of the
mark applied for, the verbal element ‘kajman’ underlines the perception of that
mark as an animal, more specifically as a caiman which belongs, together with
crocodiles and alligators, to the order of crocodilians. The Board of Appeal
did not define the level of conceptual similarity between the signs at issue.
48 In
that regard, it must be pointed out, as the Board of Appeal did, that the signs
at issue are conceptually similar, in that their component figurative elements
refer to the idea of a reptile of the order of crocodilians. Furthermore, as
regards the mark applied for, the verbal element ‘kajman’, which means ‘caiman’
inter alia in Polish, Czech, and Slovakian, as the intervener rightly points
out, and which is sufficiently close to its linguistic versions in the
languages of various other Member States, as the Board of Appeal rightly
pointed out (see paragraph 47 above), will be understood by the relevant
public, at least in those Member States, as a direct reference to its
figurative element. Each of those two elements, appearing side by side,
reinforces the other, so that consumers more easily understand one because of
the other (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment in Representation of
a pelican, cited in paragraph 38 above, EU:T:2008:114,
paragraph 91).
53 Accordingly,
it must be concluded that the relevant public will perceive the contested marks
as referring, on a conceptual level, simply to reptiles of the order of
crocodilians, if not just crocodiles, irrespective of the specific
characteristics of those representations. Therefore, the Board of Appeal was
correct in finding that the signs at issue were similar on a conceptual level.
Furthermore, bearing in mind what has been stated in paragraph 52 above,
that similarity must be regarded as being at least average and not low,
contrary to what the applicant claims.
Pues
bien, el factor determinante tenido en cuenta fue, sin lugar a dudas, la
indiscutible notoriedad adquirida por la marca LACOSTE en el mercado. Así,
aunque el grado de similitud gráfica fuera bajo, y el de similitud conceptual fuese
medio, el elevado carácter distintivo de la marca en relación con la
comercialización de productos de cuero prendas de vestir y calzado conlleva un
considerable incremento en el riesgo de confusión, pudiendo el consumidor
percibir la marca aspirante como una variante de aquélla.
The enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier
mark
54 As is
apparent from recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 207/2009, the
assessment of the likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in
particular the public’s recognition of the trade mark on the market in
question. The more distinctive the trade mark, the greater will be the
likelihood of confusion, and therefore marks with a highly distinctive
character, either per se or because of their recognition by the public, enjoy
broader protection than marks with less distinctive character (see, by analogy,
judgments of 11 November 1997 in SABEL, C‑251/95, ECR,
EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24; 29 September 1998 in Canon, C‑39/97,
ECR, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 18; and in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer,
cited in paragraph 38 above, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 20).
Emilio Hidalgo
Abogado Socio
FERNÁNDEZ-PALACIOS ABOGADOS
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